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This paper empirically tests the determinants of foreign currency hedging using a large sample of UK 
non-financial firms. I find, unlike similar studies using US data, strong evidence of a relationship 
between expected financial distress costs and the foreign currency hedging decision and more 
significantly the foreign currency only hedging decision. This contrast in the findings between this 
study and US studies might be due to the fact that several of the latter include other hedging firms in 
their non-hedging sample, which might bias the results against the a priori expectations.  However, it 
might also be due to a country specific institutional factor, that is, UK firms face higher expected costs 
of financial distress due to differences in the bankruptcy codes in the two countries. 
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1.  Introduction 
The theories of optimal hedging in general have provided explanations for the 
costs associated with cash flow variability arising from volatility in exchange rates, 
interest rates and commodity prices. These hedging theories do not make specific 
predictions about the type of exposures hedged.  In common with several previous 
studies this paper recognises that different factors might be important for each type 
of hedging.  Therefore, the empirical tests in this paper examine whether sample 
firms that report they hedge foreign currency exposure exhibit characteristics that are 
consistent with the predictions of hedging theories.    
Several studies have examined which theory of optimal hedging is consistent 
with the use of foreign currency derivatives (Wysocki (1995), Mian (1996), Géczy, 
Minton and Schrand (1997), Howton and Perfect (1998), Graham and Rogers (2000) 
and Allyannis and Ofek (2001)).  Some of these studies recognise that foreign 
currency denominated debt and currency derivatives can act as substitutes for foreign 
currency hedging (Géczy et al. (1997) and Allyannis and Ofek (2001)) however, 
none incorporate both methods into the definition of foreign currency hedging.
1  In 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Graham and Rogers (2000) the sample of non-users 
of foreign currency derivatives might include firms that use foreign currency debt.  If 
foreign currency debt is used for hedging purposes then this misclassification of 
hedging firms might impair the ability to detect differences between foreign currency 
                                                                 
1 Géczy, Minton and Scrand (1997) use foreign currency debt as an exogenous variable in their model 
of foreign currency derivatives use and Allayanis and Ofek (2001) investigate separately the use of 




hedgers and non-foreign currency hedgers.
2  This study avoids this problem by 
allowing for both methods when classifying foreign currency hedging firms.
3 
  This study also identifies another potential problem in the composition of the 
non-foreign currency hedging sample of several previous foreign currency hedging 
studies (see Wysocki (1995), Mian (1996) Géczy et al. (1997), Howton and Perfect 
(1998), Graham and Rogers (2000) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001)).  In these 
studies the non-hedging sample includes non-foreign currency hedging firms that 
might be hedging interest rate and/or commodity price exposure.  The inclusion of 
these “other” hedging firms in the non-hedging sample might make it more difficult 
to identify differences in financial and operating characteristics between foreign 
currency hedging and non-foreign currency hedging groups.
4   Given that the 
majority of these “other” hedgers are interest rate hedgers, this might explain why 
previous empirical studies have not been able to detect a relationship between 
foreign currency hedging and various proxies for the expected costs of financial 
distress. This study controls for this by excluding these “other” hedging firms from 
the non-foreign currency hedging sample.  The tests show that the removal of these 
firms results in a stronger relationship between several exogenous variables and the 
foreign currency hedging decision. 
The third contribution of this paper is the recognition that the sample of firms 
that hedge both foreign currency and interest rate exposure could be exerting undue 
                                                                 
2 Allayanis and Ofek’s (2001) results suggest that firms use foreign currency derivatives and foreign 
currency debt as a means to hedge.  Kedia and Mozumdar (2002) also find evidence to support the 
notion that firms issue foreign debt for hedging purposes. 
3 The importance of considering the range of risk management activities has been highlighted in recent 
research by Guay and Kothari (2002).  They find that derivatives usage by many US non-financial 
firms is too small relative to their risk exposures.  They suggest that this result is potentially consistent 
with firms “using derivatives to “fine tune” their overall risk-management program that likely includes 
other means of hedging.”  If correct, they argue “it emphasizes the importance of considering corporate 
derivatives use within the context of a much larger hedging program in empirical studies of corporate 
risk management.” 




influence on the relationship between foreign currency hedging and factors that are 
potentially more important for interest rate hedgers, such as the level of debt and debt 
servicing, which are used as proxies for the expected costs of financial distress.  In 
order to control for this the study estimates specifications of the empirical model for 
a sample of foreign currency only hedgers.  The empirical tests show that several 
proxies for financial distress are significantly related to the likelihood of foreign 
currency only hedging. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 presents an overview of foreign 
currency hedging studies and summarises this paper’s contribution to the existing 
literature on the determinants of foreign currency hedging.  Section 3 describes 
theories of optimal hedging and develops our hypothesis.  Section 4 describes our 
sample.  Section 5 presents tests on the determinants of foreign currency hedging and 
section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Overview of Hedging Studies 
It is well understood that capital market imperfections create an environment 
in which cash flow volatility due to exposure to financial prices might adversely affect 
shareholder wealth.  The theories of hedging that model how these imperfections 
provide an incentive to hedge do not identify the source of the financial exposure.  In 
view of this most of the early studies on the determinants of hedging investigate the 
firm’s decision to hedge any type of financial price exposure, that is, interest rate, 
foreign currency or commodity price exposure (see Francis and Stephan (1993), 
Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Dolde (1993, 1995), Wysocki (1996), Berkman 
and Bradbury (1996) and Fok, Carroll and Chiou (1997)).
5 
                                                                 
5 A recent study by Graham and Rogers (2002) investigates whether tax incentives affect the extent of 
corporate hedging with derivatives.  They use the sum of net interest rate and foreign currency 




Recent studies have focused on the type of exposure hedged, with a view to 
demonstrating that different factors may be important for each type of hedging.  Two 
studies investigate the use of foreign currency hedging instruments (Géczy, Minton 
and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001)).   Three studies examine 
separately the determinants of interest rate and foreign currency hedging (Mian 
(1996), Howton and Perfect (1998) and Graham and Rogers (2000)).  A further two 
investigate commodity price hedging in the gold mining, and the oil and gas 
industries, respectively (Tufano (1996) and Haushalter (2000)).  
A hitherto unrecognised problem for these types of empirical studies is the 
inclusion of firms hedging other exposures in the sample of non-hedgers.
6  This is  
because the existence of “other” hedging firms in the non-hedging sample might blur 
the distinction between the two groups of firms and hence reduce the power of  any 
empirical tests to detect a significant relation between foreign currency hedging and 
the various independent variables.  
Table 1 shows that six previous studies investigating foreign currency hedging 
include in their sample of non-hedgers firms hedging other exposures.  For example, 
Mian’s (1996) foreign currency sample comprises 426 foreign currency hedgers 
which is 309 less than the sample of all hedgers and 2373 non-foreign currency 
hedgers which is 309 more than the sample of non-hedgers.  This implies that the non-
foreign currency hedging sample includes 309 interest rate and/or commodity price 
hedging firms.
7  Géczy et al. (1997) investigate the use of foreign currency derivatives 
                                                                 
6 Allayannis and Weston (2001) also mention this problem in their study of the impact of foreign 
currency derivatives use by US firms on firm value.  They obtain data on the usage of interest rate 
derivatives and foreign debt for a subsample of firms and find that the bias only has a minor effect on 
their results. 
7 Mian (1996) finds, using difference in means t-tests, that currency hedgers have lower gearing than 
non-foreign currency hedgers.  The non-foreign currency hedgers include firms hedging interest rate 
and or commodity price exposure.  An inspection of Table 5, page 435 in Mian’s paper clearly 
demonstrates that the inclusion of these firms in the non-foreign currency hedging sample increases the 




by 372 large US firms and report that 220 firms (59.1 percent) use any category of 
derivative of which 154 firms (41.4 percent) use currency derivatives.  In their 
empirical tests, the characteristics of the sample of currency derivative users (154 
firms) are compared with those of the non-users of currency derivatives (218 firms), 
which include 66 firms that use derivatives other than currency derivatives or 30.3 
percent of the non-user sample. Graham and Rogers (2000) identify 242 firms with ex 
ante foreign currency exposure, 138 of these use some kind of derivative of which 105 
use currency derivatives.  Non users of currency derivatives total 137 firms of which 
33 firms use derivatives other than currency derivatives, which equates to 24.1 
percent of the non-user sample. 
Most surveys of derivative use tend to show that foreign currency and interest 
rate derivatives are the most popular categories of derivatives used whereas the use of 
commodity price derivatives lags behind in third place.  This is usually because only a 
small p roportion of the sample surveyed face commodity price exposure.
8  This 
suggests that the majority of “other” hedgers in the non-foreign currency hedging 
samples of the foreign currency studies cited above are likely to be interest rate 
hedgers.  Therefore the existence of interest rate hedgers in the non-hedging sample 
might explain why none of these studies have found statistically significant links 
between foreign currency hedging and factors that are important to interest rate 
hedgers, such as variables indicating debt levels and debt servicing ability.
9  Since 
these variables usually act as proxies for the expected costs of financial distress this 
might also explain why none of the foreign currency studies cited in Table 1 find 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
hedging sample decreases the mean value of gearing for this group.  Similar results are shown for the 
debt maturity variable. 
8 Phillips (1995) reports that of those firms with less than $250 million in sales, 86% face interest rate 
risk, 73% face foreign exchange risk, and 30% face commodity price risk.  Among large firms, he 
reports that 97% face interest rate risk, 91% face foreign exchange rate risk and 63% face commodity 




evidence in support of this hypothesis.  This study controls for this and demonstrates 
that the inclusion of other hedging firms has an adverse effect on the ability to detect a 
link between foreign currency hedging and proxies for the expected costs of financial 
distress.
10 
The empirical analysis in this paper then develops this further by recognising 
that a sample of foreign currency hedgers that includes firms also hedging interest rate 
exposure engenders bias.  This is because tests that investigate links between foreign 
currency hedging and factors that are potentially more relevant to interest rate 
hedgers, such as gearing, might be driven by the sample of foreign currency hedgers 
that also hedge interest rate exposure.  This bias could be avoided by excluding these 
firms as well as those that also hedge commodity price exposure leaving a sample of 
foreign currency only hedgers.  
 
3.  Empirical Implications of Theories of Corporate Hedging 
  The foundation of our understanding of corporate financial policy is the 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposition.  They demonstrated that given the firm's 
investment policy, with no taxes and no contracting costs, the firm's choice of 
financial policy does not affect the current market value of the firm.  An equivalent 
statement of this proposition is that if financial policy in general  - or hedging 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
9 Graham and Rogers (2002) note that financial gearing is a possible source of interest rate risk. 
10 Haushalter (2000) finds that the debt ratio is significantly related to commodity price hedging in tests 
that use a continuous measure of hedging but is not statistically significant in probit regressions.  
Haushalter argues that this indicates a test using a binary measure as a proxy for hedging may not 
detect variables associated with the extent of hedging and suggests that differences in results between 
his study and previous empirical studies could be attributed to differences in the way hedging is 
measured. Clearly a continuous measure of hedging contains more information than a simple binary 
variable and therefore might facilitate the detection of significant relationships that could otherwise go 
undetected.  Graham and Rogers (2000) seem to find support for this argument.  For example, while the 
debt ratio has a strong positive relationship with foreign currency hedging when they use their 
continuous measure (Tobit and Truncated regressions), it is not statistically significant in their probit 
regression. However, for their interest rate hedging sample they find that the use of interest rate 





11 - is to affect firm value, then it must do so through changes in tax 
liabilities, through changes in stakeholder contracting costs, or through  
interdependencies between the choice of financial policy and future real investment 
decisions.  This implies that hedging can increase firm value by simultaneously 
reducing external claims to the cash flow stream flowing from the firm's assets.  Such 
claims include taxes paid to government by the firm; bankruptcy costs (both direct 
and indirect) paid to accountants, lawyers and the firm's non-investor stakeholders; 
and/or agency costs to align managerial interests with the interests of capital 




3.1  Corporate Tax Structure 
  Smith and Stulz (1985) and Graham and Smith (1999) show that in the 
presence of  a convex corporate tax function the firm's expected tax liability can be 
reduced by hedging. The more convex the tax schedule the greater the incentive to 
hedge. The factors that cause convexity in the effective tax function are progressivity 
in the statutory tax code and tax preference items such as tax loss carry-forwards, 
investment tax credits and foreign tax credits.  
The range of progressivity in the UK corporate tax structure is relatively small 
since tax rates are progressive between profit levels of  £0 and £1.5m and constant 
beyond £1.5m.  The majority of listed firms have pre-tax profits beyond t he 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
These results would seem to suggest that Haushalter’s assertion although partially valid is not a 
complete explanation.    
11Smith and Stulz (1985) develop a positive theory of hedging by value-maximising firms in which 
hedging is part of overall corporate financing policy. 





progressive region which suggests they face a linear effective tax function.
13  This 
implies that for UK firms this tax based motive for hedging is potentially rather weak.   
Therefore, this aspect of a firm’s tax function is not measured. Many UK firms do, 
however, report the existence of tax loss carry forwards in the notes to their accounts. 
Following several previous studies this study employs a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the firm has tax loss carry forwards.
14  This data is obtained from a search of notes to 
the accounts contained in annual reports. 
 
3.2  Costs of Financial Distress 
  Firms with greater variability of cash flows are more likely to find themselves 
in financial distress, ceteris paribus.  Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that the transaction 
costs of financial distress can induce firms to hedge financial price risks since the 
probability of incurring the costs is reduced.  The savings in expected costs will vary 
directly with the probability of financial distress if the firm does not hedge and with 
the cost of financial distress.  Most studies use the gearing ratio as an indicator of the 
likelihood of financial distress to measure expected costs of distress.  This study 
adopts a similar approach and uses three additional measures as proxies for a firm’s 
probability of financial distress.  These are the interest coverage ratio, credit rating 
and a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has net interest payable or receivable.  
The higher the firm’s gearing, the lower its interest cover ratio, the lower its credit 
                                                                 
13 Mian (1996) investigates hedging practices across a sample of 3022 US firms and recognises that 
progressivity in the tax structure applies to a very narrow range of pre-tax income.  Wysocki (1996) 
writes, “Although the progressivity in the tax schedule applies over a small range of taxable income, 
generous provisions for tax loss carry forwards and investment tax credits reinforce convexities over a 
larger range of taxable income.” (pg. 6) Gay and Nam (1998) note that most public firms in the US  
have pre-tax income far in excess of the progressive region and hence use the availability of tax 
preference items to measure convexity in the tax schedule.   Brown (2001) concludes that the 
probability of HDG’s pre-tax income being in the convex region of the tax code is negligible. 
14 Graham and Rogers (2002) suggest that tax loss variables are inappropriate for capturing “incentives 
that result from the shape of the tax function” (p. 818).  Furthermore, this variable may proxy for firms 




rating and if it is paying net interest, the greater the probability of financial distress.  
A higher probability of financial distress implies higher expected costs of financial 
distress, assuming that exogenous bankruptcy costs are c onstant across firms.  
However, this assumption fails to consider the possibility that exogenous bankruptcy 
costs might affect the firm’s capital structure choice.
15   This study attempts to control 
for this by assuming firms within specific industries have a common exposure to 
financial distress and therefore uses an industry-adjusted gearing ratio.
16   The 
industry-adjusted gearing ratio is calculated by scaling a firm’s gearing ratio by its 
industry average. Firms with gearing above (below) the average for their industry will 
have an industry adjusted gearing ratio greater (less) than 1.   Finally, it is important, 
in the UK context, to include short-term loans and overdrafts in the definition of debt, 
as many short-term debts are rolled over continuously to provide long-term finance. 
 
3.3 Underinvestment Costs 
  Myers (1977) observes that when firms are likely to go bankrupt in the near 
future, shareholders may have no incentive to contribute new capital even to invest in 
positive net present value projects.
17   The is because shareholders bear the entire 
cost of the investment, but the returns from the investment accrue to the debtholders 
such that the shareholders will be worse off than if the investment had not been 
made.  A high probability of financial distress can induce shareholders to forgo 
investments that in a low probability environment would be undertaken.
18   
Bessembinder (1991) argues that since hedging reduces the probability of financial 
                                                                 
15 Géczy et al. (1997) make a similar point. 
16 Firms are classified into industries using Datastream industry classifications. 
17Myers (1977) argues that managers acting in the interests of shareholders have an incentive to forego 
positive NPV investments if (most of) the benefits accrue to debtholders (see also Bessembinder 




distress it effectively shifts individual future states from default to non-default 
outcomes.  The number of future states in which shareholders are the residual 
claimants increases and consequently they are more willing to provide funds for 
investment.  Furthermore, the hedging firm can effectively commit to meet 
obligations in states where it otherwise could not and so negotiate better contract 
terms in the form of lower borrowing costs.  Therefore risk management effectively 
expands the firm's "debt capacity".  
  Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) present an analysis in which they suggest 
that variability in internal cash flow will result in either variability in the amount 
raised externally, or variability in the amount of investment.  Variability in 
investment will be undesirable, to the extent that there are diminishing marginal 
returns to investment.  In the presence of capital market imperfections, such as 
informational asymmetries, the marginal cost of funds increases with the amount 
raised externally.  A shortfall in cash may be met with some increase in costly 
outside financing, but also some decrease in investment.  Therefore cash flow 
variability now disturbs both investment and financing plans in a way that decreases 
firm value.  This is because by decreasing planned investment the firm is foregoing 
positive net present value projects and also since it has insufficient internal funds the 
firm is forced to raise costly external finance.  According to Froot et al. hedging 
helps ensure the firm has sufficient internal funds which enables the firm to avoid 
unnecessary fluctuations in either investment spending or external financing and so 
increases firm value.   
  In both the Bessembinder (1991) and Froot et al. (1993) analysis the costs of 
underinvestment will be greater for those firms with more growth options in their 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
18Myers (1977) refers to the existence of risky debt giving rise to these adverse incentives.  The debt is 




investment opportunity set.  Firms with more positive net present value investments 
will lose more value if these projects are forgone.  In the Bessembinder (1991) 
framework the incentive to forego value enhancing projects increases as the 
probability of financial distress increases, which is determined by the level of debt 
and the variability of cash flows.  Therefore, firms with high levels of debt and where 
growth opportunities constitute a larger proportion of firm value are more likely to 
undertake a hedging programme. The Froot et al. (1993) argument suggests that 
capital market imperfections, such as asymmetric information, make external finance 
costly.  There is likely to be more asymmetric information about the quality of new 
projects f or firms with high growth opportunities and small firms. Therefore, the 
Froot et al. model predicts that hedging is more likely for firms with higher expected 
growth and for small firms.
19 This study measures underinvestment costs using four 
proxies for growth options in the firm’s investment opportunity set.  These are 
research and development expenditure deflated by total sales, capital expenditure 
deflated by total sales, the price earnings ratio and the market-to-book value of 
equity.  Firm size is measured using the natural log of total assets. 
 
3.4  Foreign Currency Exposure 
Firms with greater variation in cash flows or accounting earnings resulting 
from exposure to exchange rate risk have greater potential benefits of foreign 
currency hedging. For example, the probability of encountering financial distress is 
directly related to the firm’s cash flow volatility (Smith and Stulz (1985)).   The 
degree to which a firm’s cash flows are affected by exchange rate changes should 
depend on the nature of its activities, such as the level of export and import activity, 
                                                                 
19 The growth options argument for hedging assumes that all firms face similar correlations between 
unhedged cash flow and investment opportunities.  However, this may not be the case and thus tests 




its involvement in foreign operations, its competitors currencies, and the 
competitiveness of its input and output markets.  Unfortunately, data on firms’ 
competitors’ currencies and the market structure of their markets is not publicly 
available, however, data on foreign sales and imports and exports exists. Cash flow 
models of exposure suggest that the exposure should be related to net foreign currency 
revenues (total revenues minus costs).   However, firms only report foreign currency 
revenues and not costs and so we are forced to employ this unrefined proxy for 
foreign currency exposure.
20 Therefore, in this study the level of the firm’s cash flow 
exposure to foreign exchange rate changes is proxied using the ratio of overseas sales 
to total sales and a dummy variable denoting the existence of import and export 
activity.
21   This data is sourced from a firm’s annual report.   
 
3.5  Other Motives 
We have shown that hedging can mitigate the agency problem of 
underinvestment.  An alternative way to reduce this conflict between shareholders 
and bondholders is for the firm to reduce the level of debt in its capital structure 
(Myers (1977)). However, lowering the firm’s debt leads to a fall in the interest tax 
shield and reduces firm value.  Nance et al. (1993) argue that firms can maintain the 
tax benefits of debt and control the aforementioned agency problems by issuing 
convertible debt as opposed to straight debt.  Thus, convertible debt reduces the 
                                                                 
20 Allayannis and Ofek (2001) suggest that the foreign sales ratio is an accurate proxy of the percentage 
of net  foreign revenues out of total net revenues, if foreign profit margins are similar to domestic 
margins. 
21 Géczy et al. (1997) use the ratio of pre-tax foreign income (from the firm’s foreign operations) to 
sales, the ratio of identifiable foreign assets to total assets and the ratio of foreign sales plus export sales 
to sales.  Mian (1996) uses annual 1992 foreign sales as a percentage of total sales.  Howton and Perfect 
(1998) use a dummy variable equal to one if firms report foreign income, and zero otherwise.  They 
recognise that this variable is less sophisticated than those used in Berkman and Bradbury (1996) and 






22  However, Géczy et al. (1997) predict a positive relation 
between hedging and convertible debt on the assumption that convertible debt 
reflects additional gearing, which constrains a firm’s access to external financing.  In 
this study the use of convertible debt is measured by the ratio of book value of 
convertible debt to total assets.    
Notwithstanding the tax implications, Nance et al. (1993) suggest that firms 
can lower the probability of financial distress by issuing preference capital instead of 
debt.
23  A dividend payment due on preference capital can be postponed without any 
threat of insolvency, whereas non-payment of interest on debt can trigger insolvency.   
In this study the use of preference capital is measured by the ratio of book value of 
preference capital to total assets.   
A firm could lower the likelihood of financial distress by possessing more liquid 
assets ensuring that funds will be available to pay debt claims.   Also firms with 
higher levels of liquidity will have less need to access costly external financing to 
fund their investment programme.  Although most studies employ an indicator for 
liquidity there is variation in how liquidity is measured.  A few studies measure 
liquidity as current assets over current liabilities usually referred to as the current ratio 
(Nance et al. (1993), Mian (1996), and Fok et al. (1997)).  In other studies the quick 
ratio is preferred (Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Tufano (1996), Géczy et al. (1997), 
Howton and Perfect (1998) and Graham and Rogers (2000)).   In an UK context the 
numerator of the quick ratio includes trade debtors which incorporates accounts 
receivable after one year.  Therefore, this study employs the cash ratio defined as cash 
                                                                 
22 Nance et al. (1993) say, “convertible debt includes an embedded option on the firm’s assets which 
makes this liability more sensitive to firm-value changes and thereby reduces the sensitivity of equity 
value to firm-value changes.” Pg. 270. 
23 Géczy et al. (1997) argue that preference capital more closely mimics the properties of debt rather 




and current investments over current liabilities.  We believe the cash ratio is more 
closely aligned with a firm’s ability to meet its short-term obligations out of its readily 
realisable assets. 
Another method of reducing the probability of financial distress could include 
imposing dividend restrictions (Nance et al. (1993)). Although competing arguments  
suggest that companies facing liquidity constraints might pay little or no dividends  
(Haushalter (2000)).   Therefore, low dividends might imply liquidity constraints and 
more hedging indicating a negative association between dividend payout and hedging.  
This study uses the ratio of the gross dividend per share over share price to proxy for a 
firm’s dividend behaviour. 
  All empirical studies examine the relationship between firm size and hedging. 
There are, however, competing arguments for either a positive or negative relation 
between firm size and hedging activity.  The negative relationship between firm size 
and direct bankruptcy costs suggests that small firms have a greater incentive to 
hedge.  Small firms are also faced with greater information asymmetries and higher 
financing transaction costs which are likely to make external financing more 
expensive for smaller firms and therefore hedging more likely.  Conversely, hedging 
activity exhibits significant information and transaction cost scale economies 
implying that larger firms are more likely to hedge.
24    In this study we use the 




                                                                                                                                                                                          
availability of internal funds.  Thus, they predict a positive relationship between hedging and the 
existence of preference capital. 
24 Mian (1996) reports that hedging exposures that are less than market amounts of $5 or $10 million 




4.   Sample Description and Sources of Data on Foreign Currency Hedging 
4.1  Sample Construction 
This study analyses the foreign currency hedging practices of non-financial 
firms in the top 500 of UK firms ranked by market value as of year-end 1995.  The 
sample consists of 441 non-financial firms.  This study sources  information on 
foreign currency hedging practices from annual reports.  The majority of US studies 
on corporate hedging use annual reports to collect information on hedging activity.  
In the US financial statement information is filed electronically in various 
databases.
25  This facilitates the use of electronic searches to identify hedging firms 
and the collection of data on hedging practices.  Unfortunately, in the UK such 
facilities do not exist.  Therefore, information on hedging practices is collected by 
hand from annual reports published in 1995.   The annual reports of 412 firms out of 
the initial sample of 441 firms were obtained.   
 
4.2  Identification of Ex Ante Exchange Rate Exposure 
Following Géczy et al. (1997) and Graham and Rogers (2002) this study excludes 
firms that do not face foreign currency exposure.  Therefore in our sample a non-
hedging firm has decided not to hedge its exchange rate exposure which is different to 
that of a firm not hedging because it has no exposure to exchange rate risk.  I use the 
following as indicators of foreign currency exposure:
26 
1.  Reporting foreign sales in the notes to the accounts. 
2.  Disclosure of foreign taxes in the notes to the accounts. 
                                                                 
25 Graham and Rogers (2002) obtain information about US firms’ derivatives use from 10-K forms 
filed electronically in the EDGAR database. 
26 Géczy et al. (1997) and Graham and Rogers (2002) employ similar measures of foreign currency 
exposure.   Firms with purely domestic operations (i.e. no foreign sales or imports) may be exposed to 
exchange rates through domestic or foreign competitors who import or export.  Due to non-availability 




3.  Qualitative discussion of the existence of import or export activity or foreign 
operations in the annual report. 
The final sample comprises 366 firms that have at least one of the above sources 
of  foreign currency exposure.  None of the 46 firms eliminated through this process 
are foreign currency hedgers or foreign currency derivative users. 
 
4.3  Defining Foreign Currency Hedging Firms 
A feature of this study that distinguishes it from previous empirical tests of 
foreign currency hedging is how it defines foreign currency hedging. Most previous 
studies conduct electronic searches using keywords to identify foreign currency 
derivative users and ignore firms adopting other foreign currency hedging strategies.
27  
However, this approach fails to distinguish between foreign currency derivative use 
and foreign currency risk management.  For example, two firms may manage their 
foreign currency exposure arising from foreign assets, one firm using a currency swap 
to create a liability in the required currency, and the other using foreign denominated 
debt to act as a natural hedge of foreign revenues.  Therefore, by equating “foreign 
currency hedger” with “foreign currency derivative user,” the former would be 
characterised as a “hedger” and the latter a “non-hedger”.
28  This approach would 
make it far more difficult to identify differences between foreign currency hedgers 
and foreign currency non-hedgers.   Therefore, in this study foreign currency hedging 
firms are defined as those that provide a qualitative discussion of any foreign currency 
hedging activity in their annual report not just foreign currency derivative use.  For 
                                                                 
27 For example, Graham and Rogers (2000) use an electronic keyword search and focus their 
investigation on the use of derivatives on the grounds that derivative holdings are disclosed in financial 
statements, while other strategies are more difficult to observe.  See, also, Wysocki (1995), Géczy et al. 
(1997),  
28 Tufano (1996) makes a similar point when investigating risk management activities in the US gold 




example, firms indicating they issue foreign currency borrowings to hedge foreign 
assets are categorised as hedging firms.
29 
 
4.4  Annual Report Disclosures of Foreign Currency Hedging Practices 
  This section presents an analysis of the annual report disclosures on the 
foreign currency hedging practices of UK non-financial firms. Firms were placed into 
three categories; firms hedging foreign currency exposure, firms not hedging foreign 
currency exposure and firms providing no disclosure on foreign currency hedging.   
Panel A of Table 2 shows 79.2 percent of firms disclosed that they hedged foreign 
currency exposure, 0.6 percent stated that they did not hedge foreign currency 
exposure and  20.2 percent had no discussion of foreign currency hedging.  In this 
study non-hedgers and firms with no discussion of hedging were combined to form 
one group of  “non-hedgers of foreign currency exposure”.   
Foreign exchange hedging firms were also hedging other exposures such as 
interest rate and commodity price risks.   Panel B of Table 2 shows that 44.1 percent 
of foreign exchange hedgers only hedge this exposure whilst 55.9 percent hedge at 
least one other type of exposure.  Amongst this latter group the most frequent 
combination is that of foreign exchange and interest rate hedging. 
The sample of foreign exchange non-hedgers consists of both non-hedging 
firms and firms hedging other exposures. The inclusion of these hedgers in the non-
hedging sample might bias the empirical results against the a priori expectations.  
Panel C of Table 2 shows that 15.8 percent of foreign exchange non-hedgers  are 
other hedgers of which nearly all are interest rate only hedgers. This proportion of 
                                                                 
29 Wysocki (1995), Graham and Rogers (2000) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) take no account of the 
use of debt in their studies of the determinants of foreign currency hedging.  Although, Allayannis and 




other hedgers is smaller than that observed in Géczy et al. (1997) and Graham and 
Rogers (2000), 30.3 and 24.1 percent, respectively.   The descriptive statistics for the 
independent variables used in the univariate and multivariate analysis are presented in 
Table 3. 
 
4.5  The Use of Derivatives and Foreign Currency Debt by Foreign Currency 
Hedging Firms 
Table 4 shows that 52.2 percent of firms disclose the use foreign currency 
derivatives for hedging.  Table 5 shows that this figure is slightly higher than that 
reported in three US studies (Géczy et al. (1997), Howton and Perfect (1998), 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001)) which also investigated foreign currency derivatives use 
by large firms (i.e., S&P/Fortune 500 firms).   The other three studies in the table 
(Wysocki (1995), Mian (1996) and Graham and Rogers (2002)) draw their sample of 
firms from a much larger population and hence include a larger proportion of smaller 
firms.  This might explain why both Wysocki and Mian report a lower level of 
derivatives use.   However, Graham and Rogers focus on firms with ex ante foreign 
currency exposure and hence their reported level of foreign currency derivatives usage 
is similar to that found in samples of large firms. 
  In addition to using foreign currency derivatives for hedging purposes 
foreign currency hedging firms might also employ foreign currency debt.
30  Table 4 
shows that 54.4 percent of firms indicated that they used foreign currency debt for 
hedging.  This figure is more than double the level of foreign currency debt usage by 
US firms reported in Allayannis and Ofek (2001), 21.8 percent, and Kedia and 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
employ a foreign currency debt variable on the right hand side of their model of the determinants of the 
use of foreign currency derivatives. 
30 British Gas writes, “… exposure to foreign exchange risk is minimised by the use of financial 




Mozumdar (2002), 22 percent, and less than that found for Finnish firms by 
Hakkarainen, Kasanen and Puttonen (1997), 65 percent. Table 4 also shows that the 
use of foreign currency debt as a hedging tool is slightly more popular than foreign 
currency derivatives with 77.2 percent of foreign currency hedgers hedging with 
foreign currency debt.  This is similar to the findings of Berkman, Bradbury and 
Magan (1997), who report that over 70 percent of New Zealand hedgers use foreign 
debt financing as a financial hedge.   
 
5.  Empirical Analysis of Foreign Currency Hedging 
             This section employs univariate and multivariate tests to examine the 
determinants of the foreign currency hedging decision. 
 
5.1 Univariate Tests 
  Table 6 shows the results of comparisons between foreign currency hedgers 
and foreign currency non-hedgers using both parametric (t-test) and non-parametric 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test) tests. The number of observations may differ for the 
various comparisons due to data availability.   
  The results show that foreign currency hedging firms are more likely to have 
tax losses carried forward.  Foreign currency hedging firms also have significantly 
higher levels of gearing, higher credit ratings and lower interest coverage relative to 
non-foreign currency hedgers.  These findings provide strong support for the 
financial distress and financial contracting costs hypothesis.  Foreign currency 
hedging firms are significantly larger and employ significantly more treasury 
qualified personnel than non-hedging firms.  The t-tests show that foreign currency 




the observed relationship between the groups is opposite  to  that  predicted.  
However, in the rank sum test the market to book ratio is significantly higher for 
foreign currency hedgers. 
  The tests for differences between hedgers and non-hedgers indicates that 
foreign currency hedgers have significantly lower levels of liquidity relative to non-
hedgers.  The cash over current liabilities ratio and current ratio are significantly 
lower at the 5 level respectively whereas the quick assets ratio is not significantly 
lower. Foreign currency hedging firms also have significantly higher dividend yields, 
convertible debt and preferred equity (rank sum test only).  The observed relationship 
for convertible debt and preference capital is opposite to that predicted by the 
underinvestment and financial distress cost hypotheses, respectively.  As expected 
foreign currency hedging firms have significantly greater exposure to foreign 
currency risk than non-foreign currency hedgers, as measured by foreign sales, 
foreign tax ratio, the existence of foreign operations and the incidence of 
import/export activity.  
 
5.2  Multivariate Tests 
 
Univariate tests described above tend to be weak since they do not allow for 
interactions among the independent variables.  Therefore this section presents the 
results of multivariate tests which examine the effects of the independent variables 
on the firm’s foreign currency hedging decision.  The regressions employ a binary 
measure of foreign currency hedging.  Firms that hedge foreign currency exposure 
are assigned a value of one for the binary variable, and all other firms are assigned a 
value of zero.  Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable I estimate a 




decision.    In these regressions, the binary foreign currency hedging variable is 
regressed on variables that measure tax function convexity, expected costs of 
financial distress, firm growth, foreign currency exposure, transaction cost 
economies of scales and control variables for hedging substitutes.  The coefficients 
for the variables measuring firm growth, dividend yield, convertible debt usage and 
preference capital usage are not statistically significant in these regressions and 
therefore are ignored in subsequent multivariate regressions.  The conclusions are not 
affected by excluding these variables.  
The results from fitting the logit model are presented in Table 7 models 1 
through to 6.  The table reports both the estimated coefficient and elasticity for each 
variable.  The elasticity measures the importance of a variable in the model, where 
more important variables have larger elasticity values.
31  The elasticities show that 
firm size is ranked as the most important explanatory variable in the model.  The 
second most important variable is the foreign currency transactions dummy, followed 
by the proxies for the expected costs of financial distress, the tax loss dummy and the 
cash ratio.  These results provide support for the information and transaction cost  
economies of scale hypothesis, the foreign currency exposure hypothesis, the 
financial distress cost hypothesis, the substitutes for hedging hypothesis and the costs 
of external finance hypothesis.  
To my knowledge this is the only study to find using logit or probit regression 
methodology a significant relationship between foreign currency hedging and a 
proxy for financial distress costs.
32  In particular, the results show that the decision to 
                                                                 
31 See Theodossiou, Kahya, Saidi and Philippatos (1996) for a good discussion on elasticity of logit 
coefficients. 
32Géczy et al. (1997) use the long-term debt ratio, an industry adjusted debt ratio and S&P credit ratings 
and find no evidence in support of the financial distress cost hypothesis.  Furthermore, they present 
mixed evidence for proxies measuring underinvestment costs, which can be used to measure expected 




hedge foreign currency exposure is significantly negatively related to the level of 
interest cover, a firm’s credit rating and if it is in receipt of net interest. These 
findings are consistent with Mayers and Smith (1982), Smith and Stulz (1985), 
Mayers and Smith (1987), Bessembinder (1991) and Froot et al. (1993) who argue 
that hedging facilitates a reduction in financial contracting costs.   However, the three 
measures of gearing employed in this study, gross gearing, industry adjusted gross 
gearing and net gearing, are not significantly related to the foreign currency hedging 
decision. 
The results show that financing constraints  measured by firm liquidity 
provide incentives for hedging.   A higher cash ratio implies a significantly lower 
probability of foreign currency hedging.
33  This result is consistent with the Froot et 
al.  prediction that hedging activity is beneficial because it secures the availability of 
internal funds.  It also supports the Nance et al. prediction that the existence of 
negative debt (i.e., cash) reduces a firm’s relative need to hedge because the agency 
costs of debt and the expected costs of financial distress are lower.
34   
                                                                                                                                                                                          
no significant relation between foreign currency hedging and measures for financial distress costs, such 
as debt ratio, debt ratio times market-to-book ratio, firm profitability, tax losses and credit ratings. 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) use debt ratio, return on assets, Altman’s z -score and liquidity in a probit 
model and find that the debt ratio is significantly negatively related to foreign currency hedging 
(opposite to that predicted by theory) and the other measures are not significantly related to foreign 
currency hedging. Howton and Perfect (1998) find using a tobit model that the interest coverage ratio is 
positively related, the debt ratio negatively related and cash holdings positively related to foreign 
currency hedging (all results opposite to theory).  Wysocki (1995) does not include financial distress 
variables in his foreign currency hedging model.  Mian’s (1996) logit model does not include any debt 
based measures of financial distress. 
33 Géczy et al. (1997), Howton and Perfect (1998) and Graham and Rogers (2000) all use the quick 
ratio.  Mian (1996) uses the current ratio and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) use cash over total assets as 
their measures of liquidity.  Wysocki (1995) does not include a measure for liquidity in his tests. 
34 Géczy et al. (1997) also report a negative association between a firm’s decision to use foreign 
currency derivatives and short-term liquidity.  However, the significant results (10% level) pertain to 
their restricted R&D sample only. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find no evidence of a relationship 
between liquidity and the decision to use foreign currency derivatives.  Mian (1996) and Graham and 
Rogers (2000) use measures of liquidity, the current ratio and quick ratio respectively, in univariate 




The empirical tests provide evidence that a firm’s foreign currency exposure 
factors are significantly and positively related to hedging.
35   Finally, the positive 
firm size effect may indicate that there is a significant fixed cost component to 
implementing a foreign currency hedging program, and small firms are less likely to 
achieve sufficient benefits to offset this cost.  This finding is inconsistent with the 
notion that small firms face substantial informational asymmetry costs and therefore 
are more likely to hedge.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.3  Excluding Other Hedgers from the Non-Foreign Currency Hedging Group  
The tests in the previous section investigated the determinants of foreign 
currency hedging using samples of foreign currency hedgers versus non-hedgers of 
foreign currency exposure. As noted earlier this approach is followed by many 
previous studies investigating the determinants of foreign currency hedging (or 
foreign currency derivatives use). Table 2 shows that the  group of non-foreign 
currency hedgers includes firms hedging interest rate and/or commodity price 
exposure.  This paper argues that the inclusion of these firms, referred to as “other” 
hedging firms, in the non-hedging sample might potentially bias the results against 
finding particular hypothesised relationships.  Since the majority of other hedgers are 
interest rate hedgers this might make it difficult to detect a relationship between 
foreign currency hedging and those factors of greater relevance to interest rate 
hedgers such as levels of debt and the ability to service debt.  The results for models 
1 to 6 in Table 7 bear this out to some extent.  Although interest cover, credit rating 
and net interest receivable are significantly related to the foreign currency hedging 
                                                                 
35 This finding is consistent with the results of Wysocki (1995), Géczy et al. (1997), Howton and Perfect 




decision gearing, in its various forms, is not. To investigate whether the insignificant 
gearing results might be due to the inclusion of other hedgers, models in Table 7 are 
refitted excluding other hedging firms from the non- foreign currency hedging 
sample.  These results are shown in Table 8.  They show that all three measures of 
gearing are now significantly positively related to foreign currency hedging and that 
the coefficients for the other distress cost proxies have increased slightly.
36  Overall, 
all six proxies for financial distress are statistically significant after the exclusion of 
“other” hedging firms, whereas only three were prior to the removal of these firms. 
  These findings seem to demonstrate that the inclusion of other h edgers in the 
non-foreign currency hedging sample adversely affects the ability to detect a 
relationship between foreign currency hedging and some proxies for the expected costs 
of financial distress.   This is the case despite the fact that the non-foreign currency 
hedging sample contains only 15.8 percent of other hedgers. As mentioned previously 
a common feature of six previous studies cited in Table 1 is the inclusion of other 
hedging firms in their non-foreign currency hedging sample.  For example, Géczy et 
al.’s (1997) and Graham and Rogers (2000) samples of non-foreign currency 
derivative users contain 30 percent and 24 percent, respectively, of firms that are using 
other derivatives.  Since these proportions are greater than that for the sample 
employed in this study, it is conceivable that the bias in their samples could be greater.  
Their results would seem to bear this out since neither reported a link between 
expected costs of financial distress and the decision to hedge foreign currency 
exposure. Furthermore, none of the other foreign currency hedging studies found a 
significant relationship either
37 and only two studies report a significant relationship 
                                                                 
36 Graham and Rogers (2002) find evidence supporting the notion that capital structure and hedging 
decisions may be made simultaneously.  Therefore, it is conceivable that the findings on the gearing 
variables in this study may suffer from a simultaneity bias. 




between hedging and liquidity.
38  The evidence presented here suggests that the 
aforementioned b ias might explain why previous studies have failed to detect a 
relationship between foreign currency hedging and measures for expected costs of 
financial distress. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.4   Multivariate Tests for Foreign Currency Only Hedgers  
The empirical results in the previous sections indicate that tax loss carry 
forwards, proxies for financial distress costs, measures of foreign currency exposure, 
liquidity and firm size significantly affect the likelihood of foreign currency hedging.  
It was also noted that these relationships prevailed despite the existence of “other” 
hedgers in the non-foreign currency hedging sample.  Given that most of these “other” 
hedgers are interest rate hedgers it is somewhat surprising that the results show a 
strong relationship between foreign currency hedging and variables employed to proxy 
for the expected costs of financial distress, such as interest cover and credit rating.   
This evidence would seem to suggest that financial distress costs are an important 
factor in determining the decision to hedge foreign currency exposure.  However, the 
validity of the strength of this link can be called into question because of the structure 
of the foreign currency hedging sample.  
Closer inspection of the foreign currency h edging sample reveals a few 
interesting characteristics.   Table 2 shows that 44.1 percent of foreign currency 
hedgers are foreign currency only hedgers and 53.4 percent of foreign currency 
hedgers also hedge interest rate exposure.  It follows that since over half the sample of 
foreign currency hedgers are also interest rate hedgers it is quite possible that this 
                                                                 
38 Géczy et al. (1997) report that hedging is significantly negatively related to the level of liquidity at 




group of firms is driving the results with respect to those variables that are potentially 
of greater relevance to interest rate hedging firms such as the level of debt and the 
firm’s ability to service its debt.   
The empirical tests in this section examine this by investigating the 
determinants of foreign currency only hedging (i.e., firms that only hedge foreign 
currency exposure). The results of this analysis are presented in Tables 9 and 10.  The 
models in Table 9 include “other” hedging firms in their non-foreign currency hedging 
samples whereas the models in Table 10 exclude these firms. These results are 
generally consistent with the earlier findings.  Although, the foreign currency 
transactions dummy is now the most important explanatory variable in determining the 
likelihood of foreign currency only hedging, whereas firm size is no longer significant. 
However, a more far-reaching implication of these empirical results is that they show 
that the finding of a significant relationship between foreign currency hedging and 
several proxies for the expected costs of financial distress is not driven by the fact that 
foreign currency hedging firms are also hedging interest rate exposure.  This 
demonstrates empirically, to my knowledge for the first time, an unequivocal link 
between the foreign currency hedging decision and the expected costs of financial 
distress. 
[INSERT TABLES 9 AND 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.5  Robustness Tests 
To facilitate comparisons with studies that investigate foreign currency 
derivatives use I estimate a logit regression in which foreign currency derivative users 
are assigned a value of 1 and non-users a value of 0 for the binary dependent 
                                                                                                                                                                                          





39  This generates 215 foreign currency derivative users and 151 non-users.  
Non users include 75 firms that hedge foreign currency exposure but do not mention 
the use of derivatives and 11 firms that only hedge interest rate exposure.  Unreported 
results show that tax loss carry forwards, import/export activity and firm size are 
important factors in determining the use of foreign currency derivatives.  Of the six 
proxies employed for financial distress costs only the estimated coefficient for the 
credit rating variable is significant and consistent with this hypothesis.
40 Gross 
gearing and net gearing are both significantly negatively related to foreign currency 
derivatives use and the cash ratio is insignificant in all of the specifications 
estimated.
41   I then remove from the sample the 75 firms that hedge foreign currency 
exposure but do not use derivatives.  This leaves a sample composed of 215 foreign 
currency derivative users and 76 non-foreign currency hedgers.  Unreported analysis 
shows  a slight improvement in the relationship between the proxies for financial 
distress and the use of foreign currency derivatives.  Two of these proxies are 
statistically significant (interest cover and credit rating).  Furthermore, the cash ratio 
is significant in all specifications.  Finally, other hedging firms (mainly interest rate 
only hedgers) are excluded from the sample of non-foreign currency hedgers.  This 
leads to a significant improvement for variables proxying for financial distress costs. 
Four financial distress proxies are significant (interest cover, credit rating, net interest 
receivable and gearing).  These findings clearly demonstrate the effects of a bias 
resulting from the inclusion of hedging firms in the non foreign currency derivative 
                                                                 
39 Wysocki (1995), Géczy et al. (1997), Graham and Rogers (2000) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) 
employ this dichotomous dependent variable. 
40 Géczy et al. (1997), Graham and Rogers (2000) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find no evidence in 
support of the financial distress cost hypothesis. Howton and Perfect (1998) use a tobit model and find 
that the extent of foreign currency hedging is not related to the expected costs of financial distress. 
41  Géczy et al. (1997), Howton and Perfect (1998) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) also report a 
negative coefficient for the debt ratio, which in the latter study is also significant.  Graham and Rogers 
(2002) suggest that there could be a negative relationship between debt and foreign currency 




user sample and potentially provide an explanation for the lack of evidence in support 
of the financial distress cost hypothesis in previous foreign currency hedging studies. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
The empirical tests in this paper examine the determinants of foreign currency 
hedging for a sample of UK non-financial firms. Unlike similar earlier studies, the 
empirical tests in this paper provide strong evidence of a link between foreign 
currency hedging and various proxies for the expected costs of financial distress. A 
firm’s liquidity is also a significant determinant of foreign currency hedging which is 
consistent with the Nance et al. (1993) proposition that hedging and other financial 
policies, such as liquidity, are substitutes.   The empirical analysis demonstrates that a 
firm’s currency exposure is a very important factor that prompts firms to hedge.  The 
evidence also shows that the size of the firm is positively related to the foreign 
currency hedging decision, indicating that larger firms are more likely to hedge than 
smaller firms.  This result is consistent with significant information and transaction 
cost scale economies of hedging discouraging smaller companies from hedging.  
The empirical analysis in this paper recognises the existence of a potential bias 
created by including in the foreign currency hedging sample firms that hedge both 
foreign currency and interest rate exposure.    This biases the results in favour of 
finding a significant relationship between foreign currency hedging and factors that 
might be more important to interest rate hedgers, such as gearing.  The tests in this 
paper eliminate this bias by selecting foreign currency hedging firms that only hedge 
foreign currency exposure. The results show that several proxies for expected financial 
distress costs are important determinants of the likelihood of foreign currency hedging 




knowledge for the first time, an unambiguous relationship between the decision to 
hedge foreign currency exposure and the expected costs of financial distress. 
Overall, the results presented in this paper seem to be more supportive of a 
financial distress motive to hedge than those found in earlier, mainly US, empirical 
studies. One potential explanation is the suggestion that the tests in several US studies 
are possibly biased against finding a significant relationship between foreign currency 
hedging and the expected costs of financial distress because in these foreign currency 
hedging studies the non-hedging sample includes “other” hedging firms.  These firms 
could be those that hedge interest rate and/or commodity price exposure but not 
foreign currency exposure or firms that hedge foreign currency exposure with non-
derivative methods such as foreign debt.  These “other” hedgers might be hedging 
because of financial distress reasons (especially the interest rate hedgers) which 
potentially blurs the distinction between the two groups making it far more difficult to 
detect a relationship between foreign currency hedging and expected financial distress 
costs. Allayannis and Weston (2001) also recognise the existence of this bias in their 
study of the impact foreign currency derivatives use has on the value of US firms. 
They find that their results are unchanged when they classify interest rate only hedgers 
and firms that use foreign debt but not foreign currency derivatives as hedgers.  This 
result might imply that the bias in other studies, which employ samples that are not too 
dissimilar to that of Allayannis and Weston, is also small.   
    An alternative explanation for this apparent difference in the importance of 
financial distress as a motive for hedging between US and UK firms is the possibility 
that expected financial distress costs are higher in the UK than they are in the US.  
This might be because of differences in the bankruptcy code between these countries 




because it places greater emphasis on the shareholder retaining control in the event of 
default.  On the other hand, the code in the UK is perceived as debtholder friendly 
because it confers greater rights to creditors when reorganising a bankrupt company’s 
affairs.  If the UK rules make liquidation more likely for firms in financial distress, 
then UK firms potentially face higher expected costs of financial distress than firms in 
the US.  This would suggest UK firms have a greater incentive to hedge in order to 
lower the expected value of these costs.  Furthermore, theoretical research (Ross 
(1997) and Leland (1998)) argues that the reduction in expected distress costs as a 
result of hedging is less important than the interest tax shield from increased debt due 
to hedging for US firms.  Recent empirical research finds evidence in support of this 
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Table 1. Composition of Non-hedging Samples in Previous Empirical Studies 
Investigating Foreign Currency Hedging 
Author(s) of Study  Date  Area of Study  Non-hedger 
sample includes 
hedgers  
Proportion of other 
hedgers in non-
hedger sample (%) 
Wysocki 
 
1995  Foreign exchange hedgers  Yes  Not available 
Mian  1996  All hedgers, foreign exchange 
& interest rate hedgers 
Yes  13.02 
Géczy, Minton & Schrand 
 
1997  Foreign exchange hedgers  Yes  30.30 
Howton & Perfect  1998  All hedgers, foreign exchange 
& interest rate hedgers 
Yes  Not available 
Graham & Rogers  2000  Foreign exchange & interest 
rate hedgers 
Yes  24.10 
Allayannis & Ofek 
 
2001  Foreign exchange hedgers  Yes  Not available 
 
 
Table 2.  Foreign Exchange Hedging Activity Disclosures by UK Firms 
Table 2 presents data on the number of foreign exchange hedgers amongst the sample of 366 firms that 
are deemed to have foreign currency exposure as of year-end 1995.   Panel A provides data on the 
number of foreign currency hedging firms.   A firm is defined as a foreign exchange hedger if it 
provides a qualitative disclosure of any foreign currency hedging activity in its annual report.  Firms 
using foreign currency derivatives or foreign currency debt or internal techniques for hedging purposes 
are classified as foreign currency hedgers.  Panel B presents data on combinations of exposures hedged 
by foreign currency hedgers and panel C gives details of other exposures hedged by firms not hedging 
foreign currency exposure. 
 
Panel A: Foreign Exchange Hedging Activity  No.  % 
Hedging foreign currency exposure  290  79.2 
Not hedging foreign currency exposure  2  0.6 
No disclosure on foreign currency hedging  74  20.2 
Total  366  100 
 
Panel B: Foreign Exchange Hedgers Hedging Other Exposures  No.  % 
Foreign exchange hedging only  128  44.1 
Foreign exchange & interest rate hedging  137  47.2 
Foreign exchange & commodity price hedging  7  2.4 
Foreign exchange & interest rate & commodity price hedging  18  6.2 
Total  290  100 
 
Panel C: Foreign Exchange Non-Hedgers Hedging Other Exposures  No.  % 
Not hedging any category of exposure  64  84.2 
Interest rate hedging  11  14.5 
Commodity price hedging  1  1.3 




Table 3.  Explanatory Variables – Summary Statistics 
Table 3 provides summary information for the independent variables used in the analysis. 
 
Independent Variable  N  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
1.  Tax Function Convexity             
Tax loss carry forwards dummy  366  0.383  0  0.487  0  1 
             
2.  Expected Costs of Financial Distress             
Gross gearing   328  0.191  0.155  0.149  0  0.853 
Industry adjusted gross gearing   328  1.049  0.976  0.702  0  3.477 
Net gearing   333  0.084  0.07  0.165  -0.567  0.777 
Interest cover   359  15.702  6.588  24.897  -20.632  100 
Credit rating   350  68.783  69  18.362  0  96 
Net interest dummy  330  0.254  0  0.373  0  1 
             
3.  Costs of Underinvestment:             
Firm Growth Options             
Capital expenditure-to-sales  285  0.082  0.043  0.170  0.001  2.332 
Market-to-book ratio  329  4.284  2.477  11.585  -9.447  164.333 
Price-earnings ratio  324  25.868  18.517  50.322  6.867  791.300 
R&D expenditure-to-sales  178  3.553  0.977  16.612  0.029  194.267 
             
4. Sources of Cash Flow Volatility:              
Measures of Foreign Currency Exposure             
Foreign sales by destination  357  40.223  41.2  31.085  0  96 
Foreign sales by origin  341  32.885  28.8  28.020  0  92.2 
Overseas tax ratio  320  0.310  0.217  0.413  0  5.13 
Import/export dummy   366  0.727  1  0.446  0  1 
Foreign operations dummy  366  0.863  1  0.344  0  1 
             
5.  Hedging Substitutes             
Cash ratio   358  0.472  0.307  0.661  0  6.877 
Quick assets ratio  358  1.091  0.97  0.730  0.15  7.35 
Current ratio  358  1.528  1.378  0.867  0.3  8.535 
Convertible debt-to-total assets  358  0.007  0  0.021  0  0.135 
Preference capital-to-total assets  358  0.028  0  0.121  0  1.957 
Dividend yield  330  3.583  3.538  1.659  0  8.653 
             
6. Information and Transaction Cost              
Economies of Scale             
Market value of equity (Natural log)  362  6.409  6.013  1.317  4.170  10.363 
Total assets (Natural log)  358  5.710  5.365  1.547  2.428  10.266 
Treasury employees dummy  366  0.516  0  0.500  0  1 
 
Table 4.  Firms Using Derivatives and Foreign Currency Debt For Foreign 
Currency Hedging 
 




Foreign Currency Derivatives  215  52.2  58.7  74.1 
Foreign Currency Debt  224  54.4  61.2  77.2 
aProportion of  full sample (i.e., 412 firms).  
bProportion of firms with foreign currency exposure (366 
firms). 




Table 5.  Proportion of Foreign Currency Hedgers/Derivative Users in 
Samples of 6 Empirical Studies  
           
Author(s) of Study  Year  Sample size  No. of 
Hedgers 
No. of Non- 
Hedgers 
% of FX 
Hedgers 
Wysocki  1995 807  234  573  29.0 
Mian  1996 3022 firms  440  2582  14.9 
Géczy et al.  1997 372 Fortune 500  154  218  41.4 
Howton & Perfect
a  1998 451 Fortune 500/S&P 500         45.0 
Allayannis & Ofek  2001 724 firm years (S&P500)      43.9 
Graham & Rogers  2002 242 from 3232 firms  105  137  43.4 






Table 6.  Differences Between Foreign Currency Hedgers and Non-Foreign Currency Hedgers 
Using Two Sample T-Test and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 
Table 6 presents the results of tests of differences across a range of independent variables between foreign currency 
hedgers and non-foreign currency hedgers.  Panel A presents the results for tests of the equality of means between 
foreign currency hedgers and non-foreign currency hedgers and panel B presents the results of Wilcoxon rank sum tests. 
T-tests assume equal variances unless the null hypothesis of equal variances is rejected at a 5% significance level. 
  Panel A: Difference of means  Panel B: Wilcoxon rank 
sum test 














1.  Tax Function Convexity                     
Tax loss carry forwards dummy  290  0.417  76  0.238  0.180  3.712  0.000  H > NH  -3.453  0.001 
                     
2.  Expected Costs of Financial Distress                     
Gross gearing  264  20.299  64  14.447  5.852  3.374  0.001  H > NH  -4.743  0.000 
Industry adjusted gross gearing   264  1.123  64  0.685  0.438  5.563  0.000  H > NH  -5.579  0.000 
Net gearing   267  9.386  66  6.002  3.384  1.768  0.078  H > NH  -2.842  0.004 
Interest cover   285  11.664  74  29.675  -18.011  -5.097  0.000  H < NH  -4.764  0.000 
Credit rating   280  66.947  70  77.629  -10.682  -5.234  0.000  H < NH  -5.439  0.000 
Net interest dummy  263  0.212  67  0.367  -0.155  -3.313  0.001  H < NH  -3.276  0.001 
                     
3.  Costs of Underinvestment -                     
Firm Growth Options                     
Capital expenditure  232  0.073  53  0.113  -0.040  -1.894  0.060  H < NH  -2.182  0.029 
Market-to-book ratio  262  3.453  67  5.940  -2.487  -1.288  0.201  H > NH  -1.900  0.057 
Price-earnings ratio  260  26.092  64  30.470  -4.378  -0.608  0.544  H < NH  -0.139  0.890 
R&D expenditure   150  1.799  28  11.708  -9.909  -1.414  0.168  H > NH  -0.938  0.348 
                     
4. Sources of Cash Flow Volatility -                     
Measures of Foreign Currency Exposure                     
Foreign sales by destination  282  45.424  75  12.811  32.612 11.607  0.000  H > NH  -10.431  0.000 
Foreign sales by origin  268  37.840  73  9.015  28.825 12.090  0.000  H > NH  -10.358  0.000 
Overseas tax  255  0.362  65  0.066  0.296  9.632  0.000  H > NH  -8.797  0.000 
Import/export dummy   290  0.793  76  0.295  0.498 10.414  0.000  H > NH  -9.637  0.000 
Foreign operations dummy  290  0.934  76  0.369  0.566 12.239  0.000  H > NH  -12.384  0.000 
                     




Table 6.  Differences Between Foreign Currency Hedgers and Non-Foreign Currency Hedgers 
Using Two Sample T-Test and Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 
Table 6 presents the results of tests of differences across a range of independent variables between foreign currency 
hedgers and non-foreign currency hedgers.  Panel A presents the results for tests of the equality of means between 
foreign currency hedgers and non-foreign currency hedgers and panel B presents the results of Wilcoxon rank sum tests. 
T-tests assume equal variances unless the null hypothesis of equal variances is rejected at a 5% significance level. 
  Panel A: Difference of means  Panel B: Wilcoxon rank 
sum test 














5.  Hedging Substitutes                     
Cash ratio   284  0.410  74  0.650  -0.241  -2.539  0.012  H < NH  -0.681  0.496 
Quick assets ratio  284  1.034  74  1.178  -0.143  -1.392  0.166  H > NH  -1.139  0.255 
Current ratio  284  1.477  74  1.770  -0.293  -2.146  0.034  H > NH  -0.223  0.824 
Convertible debt-to-total assets  284  0.008  74  0.005  0.003  1.674  0.095  H > NH  -2.093  0.036 
Preference capital-to-total assets  284  0.024  74  0.027  -0.003  -0.256  0.798  H > NH  -2.949  0.003 
Dividend yield  263  3.703  67  3.271  0.431  2.293  0.022  H > NH  -2.324  0.020 
                     
6. Information and Transaction Cost                     
Economies of Scale                     
Market value of equity (Natural log)  287  6.556  75  5.856  0.700  5.892  0.000  H > NH  -4.825  0.000 
Total assets (Natural log)  284  5.906  74  5.063  0.843  5.552  0.000  H > NH  -4.941  0.000 





Table 7.  Logistic Regression Results of the Likelihood of Foreign Currency Hedging  
Table 7 shows logit regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm hedges foreign currency exposure and proxies for incentives to hedge. Models 1 
through to 6 investigate foreign currency hedgers versus foreign currency non-hedgers.  The latter include interest rate and/or commodity price hedgers.  The cash ratio is 
dropped from models 3 and 6 because the level of cash holdings is a key component of net interest and net gearing.  The data are presented as log of odds (Coeff.) and 
elasticities (Elast.). The elasticity measures the percentage change in the probability of hedging for a 1 percent change in the independent variable and effectively measures the 
importance of the variable in the model.  More important variables have larger elasticity values. Unlike the logit coefficients, the elasticity is independent of measurement units 
for the variables. Elasticities are measured at the mean of the independent variables. The final column of the table reports the average ranking for each variable’s elasticity 
across the 6 models.  The six financial distress variables are given one ranking.   A variable in a model is ranked according to the absolute size of its elasticity where the highest 
value is accorded a rank of 1.  Only statistically significant elasticities are ranked. P-values are in parentheses and are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  
***, 
**, 
 * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Elasticiy 
  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Ranking 
Tax loss carry forwards dummy  0.715**  0.041**  0.658**  0.035**  0.872***  0.048**  0.879**  0.047**  0.881**  0.046**  0.804**  0.045**  4 
 (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.042)  (0.048)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.018)   
Interest cover   -0.018*** -0.042***                      
  (0.001)  (0.003)                       
Credit rating       -0.027*** -0.261***                  
      (0.006)  (0.004)                   
Net interest receivable dummy           -1.127*** -0.041***              
          (0.007)  (0.010)               
Gross gearing               0.013  0.033           
              (0.475)  (0.473)           
Industry adjusted gearing                  0.414  0.059       
                  (0.161)  (0.161)       
Net gearing                      0.978  0.012  3 
                      (0.464)  (0.467)   
Foreign currency transactions dummy  1.744***  0.189***  1.681***  0.171***  1.734***  0.186***  1.604***  0.165***  1.583***  0.160***  1.607***  0.176***  2 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
Cash ratio  -0.546*** -0.038*** -0.450**  -0.029**      -0.576**  -0.037**  -0.529**  -0.034**      5 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.021)  (0.023)      (0.032)  (0.042)  (0.039)  (0.049)       
Natural log of Total Assets  0.403***  0.341***  0.572***  0.451***  0.497***  0.410***  0.508***  0.403***  0.491***  0.383***  0.518***  0.439***  1 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
                           
No. of Observations  358    351    327    325    325    330     
No. of foreign currency hedgers  284    279    260    261    261    264     
No. of non-foreign currency hedgers  74    72    67    64    64    66     
-2 Log Likelihood Ratio (Chi-squared)  82.51    78.178    68.054    66.378    67.79    56.79     
Pseudo R




Table 8.  Logistic Regression Results of the Likelihood of Foreign Currency Hedging  
Table 8 shows logit regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm hedges foreign currency exposure and proxies for incentives to hedge. Models 1 
through to 6 investigate foreign currency hedgers versus non-hedgers.   The latter exclude all hedging firms.  The cash ratio is dropped from models 3 and 6 because the level 
of cash holdings is a key component of net interest and net gearing. The data are presented as log of odds (Coeff.) and elasticities (Elast.). The elasticity measures the 
percentage change in the probability of hedging for a 1 percent change in the independent variable and effectively measures the importance of the variable in the model.  More 
important variables have larger elasticity values. Unlike the logit coefficients, the elasticity is independent of measurement units for the variables. Elasticities are measured at 
the mean of the independent variables. The final column of the table reports the average ranking for each variable’s elasticity across the 6 models.  The six financial distress 
variables are given one ranking.   A variable in a model is ranked according to the absolute size of its elasticity where the highest value is accorded a rank of 1.  Only 
statistically significant elasticities  are ranked.   P-values are in parentheses and are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  
***, 
**, 
 * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Elasticiy 
  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Ranking 
Tax loss carry forwards dummy  1.011***  0.043***  0.938**  0.036**  1.164***  0.049***  1.149***  0.040***  1.219**  0.046***  1.058***  0.043***  4 
 (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.008)   
Interest cover   -0.019*** -0.035***                      
  (0.001)  (0.003)                       
Credit rating       -0.030*** -0.208***                  
      (0.002)  (0.002)                   
Net interest receivable dummy           -1.297*** -0.037***              
          (0.004)  (0.009)               
Gross gearing               0.063***  0.107***           
              (0.002)  (0.001)           
Industry adjusted gearing                  0.838**  0.086**       
                  (0.028)  (0.028)       
Net gearing                      3.384**  0.028**  3 
                      (0.021)  (0.029)   
Foreign currency transactions dummy  1.510***  0.128***  1.440***  0.111***  1.515***  0.128***  1.542***  0.107***  1.406***  0.106***  1.468***  0.122***  2 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
Cash ratio  -0.532*** -0.028*** -0.438**  -0.021**      -0.646**  -0.027*  -0.522**  -0.024*      5 
 (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.030)  (0.034)      (0.045)  (0.055)  (0.045)  (0.058)       
Natural log of Total Assets  0.518***  0.333***  0.717***  0.415***  0.578***  0.368***  0.428***  0.225***  0.516***  0.293***  0.539***  0.337***  1 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
                           
No. of Observations  346    339    317    316    316    320     
No. of foreign currency hedgers  284    279    260    261    261    264     
No. of non-foreign currency hedgers  62    60    57    55    55    56     
-2 Log Likelihood Ratio (Chi-squared)  82.226    77.04    68.426    77.596    72.328    62.804     
Pseudo R




Table 9.  Logistic Regression Results of the Likelihood of Foreign Currency Only Hedging  
Table 9 shows logit regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm only hedges foreign currency exposure and proxies for incentives to hedge. Models 1 
through to 6 investigate foreign currency only hedgers versus foreign currency non-hedgers. The latter include interest rate and/or commodity price hedgers.  The cash ratio is 
dropped from models 3 and 6 because the level of cash holdings is a key component of net interest and net gearing.  The data are presented as log of odds (Coeff.) and elasticities 
(Elast.). The elasticity measures the percentage change in the probability of hedging for a 1 percent change in the independent variable and effectively measures the importance 
of the variable in the model.  More important variables have larger elasticity values. Unlike the logit coefficients, the elasticity is independent of measurement units for the 
variables. Elasticities are measured at the mean of the independent variables. The final column of the table reports the average ranking for each variable’s elasticity across the 6 
models.  The six financial distress variables are given one ranking.   A variable in a model is ranked according to the absolute size of its elasticity where the highest value is 




denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Elasticity 
  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Ranking 
Tax loss carry forwards dummy  0.677*  0.083*  0.663*  0.081*  0.976***  0.120**  0.987***  0.122**  0.964**  0.118**  0.825**  0.102**  3 
  (0.058)  (0.064)  (0.062)  (0.070)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.022)  (0.025)   
Interest cover   -0.020*** -0.142***                      
  (0.002)  (0.004)                       
Credit rating       -0.022**  -0.541**                   
      (0.043)  (0.040)                   
Net interest receivable dummy           -1.558*** -0.172***              
          (0.001)  (0.001)               
Gross gearing               0.011  0.061           
              (0.481)  (0.481)           
Industry adjusted gearing                  0.547*  0.170*       
                  (0.057)  (0.062)       
Net gearing                       1.409  0.026  2 
                      (0.283)  (0.283)   
Foreign currency transactions dummy  1.836***  0.449***  1.719***  0.413***  2.014***  0.503***  1.824***  0.452***  1.846***  0.452***  1.759***  0.443***  1 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
Cash ratio  -0.569*** -0.101*** -0.539*** -0.094**      -0.631**  -0.110**  -0.570**  -0.098**      4 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.011)      (0.034)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.048)       
Natural log of Total Assets  0.006  0.010  0.163  0.277  0.051  0.087  0.097  0.164  0.037  0.062  0.100  0.174  5 
  (0.969)  (0.969)  (0.276)  (0.276)  (0.737)  (0.738)  (0.571)  (0.572)  (0.818)  (0.818)  (0.536)  (0.538)   
                           
No. of Observations  199    195    179    175    175    179  179   
No. of foreign currency hedgers  125    123    112    111    111    113  113   
No. of non-foreign currency hedgers  74    72    67    64    64    66  66   
-2 Log Likelihood Ratio (Chi-squared)  51.918    43.374    41.972    37.354    40.452    28.688  28.688   
Pseudo R




Table 10.  Logistic Regression Results of the Likelihood of Foreign Currency Only Hedging  
Table 10 shows logit regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm only hedges foreign currency exposure and proxies for incentives to hedge. Models 1 
through to 6 investigate foreign currency only hedgers versus non-hedgers. The latter exclude all hedging firms.  The cash ratio is dropped from models 3 and 6 because the level 
of cash holdings is a key component of net interest and net gearing. The data are presented as log of odds (Coeff.) and elasticities (Elast.). The elasticity measures the percentage 
change in the probability of hedging for a 1 percent change in the independent variable and effectively measures the importance of the variable in the model.  More important 
variables have larger elasticity values. Unlike the logit coefficients, the elasticity is independent of measurement units for the variables. Elasticities are measured at the mean of 
the independent variables. The final column of the table reports the average ranking for each variable’s elasticity across the 6 models.  The six financial distress variables are 
given one ranking.   A variable in a model is ranked according to the absolute size of its elasticity where the highest value is accorded a rank of 1.  Only statistically significant 
elasticities  are ranked. P-values are in parentheses and are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.  
***, 
**, 
 * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Independent Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Elasticity 
  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Coeff.  Elast.  Ranking 
Tax loss carry forwards dummy  0.931**  0.095**  0.917**  0.091**  1.234***  0.127***  1.177***  0.115***  1.247***  0.123***  1.061***  0.108***  3 
  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.009)   
Interest cover   -0.021*** -0.134***                      
  (0.001)  (0.004)                       
Credit rating       -0.026**  -0.517**                   
      (0.018)  (0.018)                   
Net interest receivable dummy           -1.738*** -0.169***              
          (0.001)  (0.001)               
Gross gearing               0.061***  0.239***           
              (0.002)  (0.003)           
Industry adjusted gearing                  0.868***  0.217***       
                  (0.009)  (0.010)       
Net gearing                       4.352**  0.048**  2 
                      (0.017)  (0.020)   
Foreign currency transactions dummy  1.639***  0.358***  1.506***  0.318***  1.819***  0.406***  1.710***  0.357***  1.662***  0.352***  1.672***  0.370***  1 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   
Cash ratio  -0.565*** -0.084*** -0.526*** -0.075**      -0.593**  -0.083**  -0.560**  -0.079**      4 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.012)      (0.039)  (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.050)       
Natural log of Total Assets  0.163  0.237  0.361**  0.504**  0.164  0.237  0.052  0.071  0.131  0.181  0.164  0.238  5 
  (0.338)  (0.338)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.327)  (0.341)  (0.778)  (0.778)  (0.453)  (0.456)  (0.344)  (0.351)   
                           
No. of Observations  187    183    169    166    166    169     
No. of foreign currency hedgers  125    123    112    111    111    113     
No. of non-foreign currency hedgers  62    60    57    55    55    56     
-2 Log Likelihood Ratio (Chi-squared)  48.194    39.368    40.128    43.604    41.984    33.194     
Pseudo R
2  0.2028    0.1700    0.1857    0.2068    0.1991    0.1546      
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